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Abstract
Saudi Arabia’s coalition-based intervention in the Yemeni Civil War in March 2015 
marked a stark departure from its previous foreign policy characterized by the lever­
age of its financial power (“riyalpolitik”) instead of military interventionism. Saudi 
Arabia’s “new assertiveness” in recent years has been analyzed as a form of balanc­
ing against Iran and a reaction against regional instability in the aftermath of the 
Arab Uprisings since 2011 and the US withdrawal from the region. While this 
explains the heightened foreign policy activity and militarization, it does not pres­
ent a convincing rationale for the Saudi intervention in Yemen: Why not confront 
Iranian expansionism in Syria or Iraq? And why would a largely reclusive autoc­
racy model its alliance formation after the Western “coalition of the willing”? By 
adding insights from literature on autocratic institutions to the existing systemic 
arguments, this article suggests that while regional power shifts provided the op­
portunity structure for Saudi assertiveness, the symbolic dimension of the coalition 
to signal regional leadership explains the shape of its new regional foreign policy.
Keywords
Regional Power, Regional Hegeomny, Autocratic Foreign Policy, Military Coalitions
Introduction
W hen Adel al-Jubair, then Saudi Ambassador to the United States, announced in 
a press conference on March 26,2015 that Saudi Arabia had launched a military 
operation together with nine other countries in Yemen to “defend the legitimate 
government of President Hadi from the takeover attempts by the Houthi mili­
tias in Yemen” who had taken over the capital Sana’a (A1 Arabiya 2015a), many 
observers were dumbfounded. That Saudi Arabia and its neighbors took military
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initiative seems to herald a new era of Gulf foreign policy. How did this come to 
pass? And is it more than an ephemeral phenomenon?
Bringing IR, Middle East area studies and autocracy research together, this article 
aims to explain the shape of Saudi Arabia’s recent foreign policy activity focusing 
on the intervention in Yemen. It thereby follows a recent call for IR  approaches 
to account for the changed regional context since the transformative wave of the 
Arab Uprisings since 2011 (Valbjorn 2017). While the Saudi Arabian foreign 
policy activism and its militarization has already been illuminated by a combina­
tion of Neorealist balance-of-threat approaches and identity factors, the choices 
of tactics and arenas of the struggle for regional hegemony have not yet been 
adequately covered. This article attempts to illuminate these choices exemplified 
by the formation and leadership of the “Decisive Storm” coalition in Yemen by 
utilizing research on symbolic functions of autocratic institutions. I t proceeds by 
sketching the puzzle of the militarization of Saudi politics and the decision to 
intervene in the Yemeni Civil War, followed by a structured presentation of the 
research explaining this heightened activity and the introduction of insights from 
autocracy research to explain the intervention in Yemen by symbolic functions of 
authoritarian institutions.
The Rediscovery o f the G ulf Military Ethos: From Gbazwa to Riyalpolitik and 
Back?
Up to the early 20th century, wars, skirmishes and raids by desert warriors were a 
ubiquitous experience for the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, these were so common 
that the Arabic word for raid---- has made it into European languages in the ver­
sion of the “razzia”. The history of state formation in the Peninsula is essentially 
a history of war and conquest as much as it is a history of the political economy 
of oil and colonial politics. The most “militarized” of these states, up to the early 
20th century, was Saudi Arabia, founded in 1932 by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Saud. Also 
known as Ibn Saud in the West, he was a major military leader, often stylized in 
the Western image as a “desert warrior” (Al-Rasheed 2010, p.5).
Yet, for the rest of the century, military action was almost completely discarded. 
After the 1934 Saudi Arabian-Yemeni War, Saudi troops were rarely utilized 
abroad apart from token divisions sent to the Arab effort against Israel. O f the 
444 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between 1945-2001 involving par­
ticipants from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia appears as a participant merely 
34 times (out of 748 Middle East participants overall; in 7.7% of disputes and 
forming 4.5% of all dispute participants) (Ghosn, Palmer 8c Bremer 2004).1 This
1 Compared to its neighbors in the region it remains a very low number, especially for its size. All other 
large states in the M iddle East (except for Morocco and Algeria) and even tiny Lebanon participated 
more often, referring Saudi Arabia to the 7th rank in terms of M ID  involvement. The figures cover the
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is despite its long history of independence and ample reason (many unsolved ter­
ritorial conflicts) and opportunity (being large and wealthy) for militarized action.
While Arab states in other sub-regions of the Middle East and North Africa 
modernized their militaries, waged major interstate wars and used the military 
to transform society and state, Saudi Arabia instead saw a “military moderniza­
tion in reverse” (Cronin 2013, p.2). In fact, in the late 1970s, the Saudi National 
Guard (SANG), the tribally-based military counterbalancing the regular army 
and making up one third of all troops, remained the “only force in over thirty 
Third World countries unable to maintain and service its own armoured vehicles!” 
(Ayubi 1995, p.283). Financial support -  “Riyalpolitik” — was pursued instead of 
military participation in war and conflicts in post-statehood years: examples in­
clude the support of the Royalists in the 1962-1967 Yemeni Civil War, of various 
factions in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), and of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988). Only with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990 did 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in general provide an (albeit limited) number 
of troops to the coalition (Allison 2012, pp.120-122; Heard-Bey 2006, p.205).
The lamentations about Gulf military efficiency have a long tradition -  from being 
showcases of politicized fragmentation and deliberate weakening of the military 
aimed at coup-proofing the regime (Quinlivan 1999; Hertog 2011) to forming 
the culmination of a general tendency towards military inefficiency in Arab mili­
taries (Pollack 2002). Already in 1995, Ayubi notes the discrepancy between the 
high military spending, both in absolute terms and terms relative to GDP, and the 
lacking military effectiveness and performance of the Saudis: “In short therefore 
the state of Saudi Arabia’s military capability leaves much to be desired” (1995, 
p.280). Pollack reserves the most scathing assessment of the inefficacy of Arab 
militaries for the Saudi case, blaming the oil wealth and strong reliance on the US 
for magnifying the effect: “In the end, they had little to show for their billions of 
dollars spent on defense since the first oil boom. Saudi troops suffered from all of 
the same problems as other Arab armies, only worse” (Pollack 2002, p.446).
In light of these long-term developments, the sudden flurry of military adven­
turism of the kingdom and its smaller neighbors seems all the more surprising. 
There have been early signs of an increased foreign policy activism and military 
outlook of the Gulf states in the last few years, catalyzed by the turmoil ignited by 
the Arab Uprisings. Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait have passed laws to introduce 
compulsory military service for citizens in 2013-2015 (Smith Diwan 2015; So­
phia 2015). Hitherto, their militaries were mostly composed of foreign nationals, 
who made up most of the workforce in all other work areas seen as “menial” in the 
states whose populations are overwhelmingly composed of guest workers. These
time period 1945-2001 and exclude Sudan and Turkey. Otherwise, the tendency would be even more 
pronounced.
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activities have been accompanied by a steep rise in defense spending and weapons 
procurement (although the budget especially in Saudi Arabia has slumped since 
2015 because of low oil prices) (IISS 2017).
Following the 2011 uprising, Peninsula Shield Force (the military component of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC) troops were sent to Bahrain to quell 
protests (Guzansky 2014). In August 2014, the UAE and Egyptian air forces 
surprised observers when they conducted joint airstrikes against the Islamist 
“Dawn” (Fajr) alliance in Libya (Kirkpatrick &  Schmitt 2014). Since 2014, the 
monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE as well as Jordan and Mo­
rocco were the Arab participants in the US-led anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition 
(“Inherent Resolve”) that flew airstrikes against IS targets on Syrian territory 
(Jordan later expanded to Iraq). However, the contributions of the GCC states 
were limited and criticism of a lack of commitment on the Arab part abounded 
(Thompson 2015). Saudi pledges to commit more resources and possibly ground 
troops in Syria were soon forgotten (or retracted) (Mustafa &  Mehta 2016).
An effective military slowly became a greater priority for the GCC states with 
Saudi Arabia pushing greater cooperation and coordination in the security sphere. 
In its 34th summit in December 2013, the GCC had agreed on the establishment 
of a joint military command that was to be instituted alongside the Peninsula 
Shield Force and to have a force of 100,000, half of which to be provided by Saudi 
Arabia (Saidy 2014). A t the summit the following year, the institution of a joint 
police force (based in Abu Dhabi) and a joint navy (based in Bahrain) were de­
cided (Vela 2014). A project that transcends the Gulf is a joint military command 
in the Arab League frame supposed to number 40,000 (Mustafa 2015) which has, 
however, not progressed since 2015.
Saudi Arabia’s regional engagement grew extensively since 2011. Apart from its 
participation in the anti-IS coalition and its engagement in Bahrain, its notable 
activities include the intensive support of rebels in Syria (Hokayem 2014). Many 
of Saudi Arabia’s projects include large-scale multilateral coalition-building. In 
December 2015, the kingdom announced the formation of a by now 37-mem- 
bers-strong Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) (although 
some of the alleged members initially expressed surprise at their inclusion) (Gaub 
2016), and conducted a major military exercise in February 2016 (“North Thun­
der”) which reportedly involved 150,000 troops from 20 countries (Riedel 2016). 
Following years of enormous defense spending, it now has the best-equipped 
military after Israel (IISS 2017, p.401).2
2 Although the title for the most capable armed forces in the Gulf is held by the UAE (IISS 2017, 
p.409).
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The intervention in the Yemeni Civil War: Operation “Decisive Storm” {Asifat 
al-Hazm)
The most impactful engagement which will form the focus of the analysis is, how­
ever, the military intervention in Yemen initiated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
in March 2015. In September 2014, the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia militia, took over 
the Yemeni capital Sana’a. After encroaching on the provisional capital in Aden 
on May 25, 2015, the Houthi invasion caused President Abd Rabbo Mansour 
Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia from where he called for military support against the 
rebels, citing Article 51 of the UN charter. Saudi Arabia announced its intentions 
of forming a military coalition and launched airstrikes overnight on March 26, 
2015. Apart from the kingdom, nine countries agreed to join from the outset: the 
UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, Pakistan and Sudan -  in­
cluding all GCC members except for Oman. Senegal, Somalia and Eritrea later 
also agreed to join the coalition (Binnie 2015a; Madabish 2015). US President 
Barack Obama authorized logistical and intelligence support which was soon 
expanded (Hennigan, King &  Al-Alayaa 2015). The main drivers behind and 
architects of the Yemen intervention were Saudi Arabian and the UAE decision­
makers.3
Saudi Arabia contributed the most resources to the coalition and reported de­
ploying 100 fighter jets and 150,000 troops while Qatar sent 10, Bahrain and 
Kuwait 15 jets in the first hours (Shaheen &  Kamali Dehghan 2015).4 Except for 
Pakistan, where parliament resisted military participation, all the other initiative 
countries sent fighter jets as well, the UAE 30, and Jordan up to six (AFP 2015). 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE also deployed Special Forces in July (Binnie 2015b). 
In contrast to “Inherent Resolve” in Syria and Iraq, the intervention in Yemen 
also included ground troops from the outset, initially 3,000 from Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE alone (Salisbury &  Kerr 2015). Qatar reportedly provided another 
1,000 troops before dropping out of the coalition following the row with Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain in June 2017 (El Yaakoubi 2017). Apart from the 
high material costs of the coalition, great losses were also incurred in terms of ca­
sualties. Having been mostly unaccustomed to war and war casualties, battlefield 
deaths had a dramatic effect. One of the most shocking events for the Gulf mon­
archies transpired on September 4, when 52 Emirati, 10 Saudi and 5 Bahraini 
soldiers were killed during a single operation (Smith Diwan 2015). In June 2016, 
the UAE announced the end of the military part of its operation, but Emirati 
troops remained in place, even leading to further casualties (Kedem 2016). Saudi
3 Especially the Crown Princes o f Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, M uhamm ad bin Salman and M u­
hammad bin Zayed, are most often identified as the architects of the intervention (Henderson 2017).
4 All troop numbers are based on open-source media inform ation and are probably highly exaggerated. 
M ore credible estimates put the numbers o f Saudi combat troop numbers at about 3,500 (with 6,500 
support personnel) (M ustafa &  M ehta 2016).
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Arabia suffered the greatest losses although the casualty number are a matter of 
great debate, ranging from officially 300 to up to tenfold the number (Law 2016). 
Never before had the Saudi rulers sacrificed their own citizens in wars for their 
national goals on such a scale.
To be clear, it was not the first time that Arab states formed military coalitions 
against a common threat (the multiple Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 to 1973). It 
was also not the first time Saudi Arabia was involved militarily in Yemen (e.g. in 
the Yemeni Civil Wars and airstrikes against the Houthis in 2009-2010). But it 
was the first time that Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, militarily weak and inex­
perienced, especially in ground combat, designed and lead a prolonged military 
operation involving heavy burdens and commitment on their own, under purely 
regional leadership. Even in conflicts of vital importance to the Saudis, as during 
the Yemeni Civil War 1962-1967 and the two Yemeni border clashes in 1972 
and 1979, the kingdom has never committed its own armed forces for offensive 
purposes. For most of its history, Saudi Arabia “could not credibly threaten either 
[South or North] Yemen with direct military attack” (Gause 1990, p.10).
But the puzzle is not just Gulf or Saudi military initiative per se, but also its shape. 
The coalition that carried out “Decisive Storm” (asifat al-hazm) resembles “coali­
tions of the willing” which are usually initiated and led by multilateral-minded 
democracies (mostly, the US). I t is no accident that even the name invokes the 
“Desert Storm” {asifat al-sahra' in Arabic) operation against Saddam Husseins 
occupation of Kuwait. Being an autocratic monarchy, Saudi Arabia always es­
chewed “friendships that are too close and also enmities that are too intense” 
(Gause 1994, p.121) and did not initiate large-scale committed coalitions.
The choice of intervention location also warrants an explanation. The main jus­
tifications for the intervention cited by the coalition members are the restora­
tion of the “legitimate government” of Yemen and the containment of Iranian 
expansionism. However, most researchers concur that the evidence for Iranian 
involvement in Yemen has been minor to non-existent — at least before the inter­
vention (e.g. Juneau 2016). Given its broad activities in the region and its major 
investment in the Syrian Civil War, why open another battle ground, one which 
is not even well suited to balance and contain the main rival?
Why Militarization? Shifts in Regional Power Constellations: The W ith­
drawal o f the US, the Rise of Iran
Traditionally, foreign policy in the Middle East and especially of Saudi Arabia has 
often been explained with variants of Neorealist balance-of-power (Waltz 1979) 
and balance-of-threat approaches (Walt 1990). Already implied in Walt’s theory, 
ideational factors regarding threat perception were inseparable from material ca-
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pabilities. These approaches were then enhanced by the concept of omnibalancing 
(David 1991) that adds the dimension of regime security that is especially rel­
evant for autocracies (see e.g. Nonneman 2005). According to the omnibalancing 
approach, states, and especially autocracies, do not only balance against external, 
but also domestic threats and the external powers allied with them. To that end, 
they may even align with secondary adversaries (David 1991, pp.235—236).
These approaches, combining external and domestic security as the main drivers 
of foreign policy, are still dominating explanations of heightened foreign policy 
activity of Saudi Arabia and the international relations of the Persian Gulf in the 
last few years (Legrenzi &  Gause 2016, p.306). The geopolitical restructuring of 
the region since 2011 has fundamentally changed the regional security context 
and opened windows of opportunity for heightened activism of regional actors 
(see e.g. Colombo 2017; Gause 2017; Salloukh 2017; Mabon 2015).
The timing of Saudi activism coincides with major shifts in the behavior and 
capabilities of its main ally — the US — and its main rival -  Iran. As the US, previ­
ously an extra-regional hegemon, withdraws, a power vacuum ensues -  to be filled 
by one of the regional powers. The withdrawal created an opportunity structure 
that enabled the foreign policy aspirations and activity of non-traditional regional 
powers like Qatar and the UAE (Ulrichsen 2017; Kamrava 2013) and boosted the 
activity of the dominant power on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia.
Whereas previously, Persian Gulf dynamics were shaped by the power triangle of 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq (Fürtig 2007), the collapse of Iraq following the US 
invasion in 2003 turned the tripole into a bipolar competition. W hen faced with 
the Scylla of Iran and the Charybdis of Iraq, Saudi Arabia had to remain wary of 
both. W ith the collapse of Iraq as a relevant state actor, the kingdom could turn its 
focus to an arms race with the only remaining regional power—Iran. Catalyzed by 
the turmoil since 2011, a classic security dilemma ensued — both on the material 
and ideological/identity level (Mabon 2015,2017; Partrick 2016).
US-Saudi relations were already tense following the superpower’s perceived re­
neging on alliance commitments to long-standing US ally Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt in 2011, a dynamic the rise of Iran in a contested regional system ex­
acerbated (Fawcett 2015; Baxter &  Simpson 2015). US behavior towards Iran 
fueled Saudi suspicions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), the 
agreement between the P5+1+EU (and thereby the US) and Iran on nuclear non­
proliferation, deepened the Iran-Saudi rivalry in the short run. Not only did it 
provide Iran with greater economic capabilities, it also bestowed international 
recognition on the pariah state and thus re-incorporated it into regional power 
constellations (Bahi 2017). This additional sign of US “abandonment” parallel to 
the boost of Iranian capabilities further stoked fears that induced self-reliance,
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even in the nuclear sphere where a nuclear arms race seems likely in case of an 
Iranian nuclear breakout (Cigar 2016).
Identity and perception are inseparable from balance-of-threat explanations in 
the Middle East (cf. Gause 2017; Hinnebusch &  Ehteshami 2014). The percep­
tion of the Iranian threat is governed not only by material capabilities but also by 
two major identity-linked ways in which it undermines Saudi domestic stability. 
First, it challenges the core of the ruling family’s religious legitimacy by showing 
an alternative form of Islamic government: an “Islamic Republic” instead of the 
Islamic monarchy. Secondly, it is seen by Saudi Arabia as fostering “sectarianism” 
and instigate rebellion and separatism of Shia groups in a Sunni-majority Arab 
world (al-Saud 2004; Hubbard &  Sheikh 2015). That Saudi Arabia chooses to 
balance against Iran is therefore no surprise, whether the Iranian ascendancy is 
real or imagined by the kingdom.
However, Saudi Arabia’s ability to form an alliance against Iran is impeded by two 
main problems. First, the traditional regional hegemon, Saudi ally and balancer 
against Iran, the US, is unable and unwilling to fulfill this role anymore. While 
the military bases are still present, the political will to be involved is weakened. 
The last two presidents, Donald Trump as well as Barack Obama campaigned on 
policies calling for isolationism or a “pivot to Asia”, i.e. away from Europe and the 
Middle East.5
Second, attracting regional allies for the purpose of balancing is impeded by ideo­
logical obstacles that lead to “underbalancing”, i.e. the failure of multiple regional 
states who also see Iran as a threat (like Israel, Egypt and Turkey or Sunni states 
in general) to ally (Gause 2017).
The rise of Iran and withdrawal of the US are the main drivers for the new Saudi 
“assertiveness” and militarization. But additional explanation is warranted to ex­
plain the shape of that assertiveness and the engagement in Yemen. While bal­
ance-of-threat approaches can also explain why Saudi Arabia chose to tackle the 
Houthis instead of IS, they do not explain why it chose Yemen instead of the 
Assad regime in Syria. Fighting IS in Syria or Iraq would strengthen Iran as it 
would ultimately benefit the allied Syrian regime. But Assad’s Syria, as the only 
“state” ally to Iran apart from the weak and fragmented Iraqi government, is so 
vital to the Islamic Republic that it invests massive resources and parts of its own 
military to avoid regime change. The periphery Houthis tribal warriors and their 
allies, however, are of low strategic importance and consequently do not enjoy pri­
ority in Iranian calculations and little tangible support. Weakening Assad in Syria
5 Given the erratic nature o f D onald Trum p’s foreign policy thus far, the current adm inistration’s 
anti-Irani an rhetoric is unlikely to lead to a long-term  change towards a return  to  C old-W ar-era 
interventionism.
72
Regio nalLeadershipinAuthoritarianContexts-S audiArabiasN ewMilitarylnterventionismasPartofltsLeadershipB idintheMiddleEast
would harm Iranian influence much more than weakening the Houthis and their 
allies -  still, Saudi Arabia’s battleground choice took the opposite route. Instead 
of allying with the militarily most powerful states in the region (most of which 
are anti-Iranian), it chose to amass a “coalition of the willing”, a cooperation form 
known from democracies, with itself at the helm. Saudi Arabian coalition-build­
ing in Yemen, but also in the IM A FT mostly consists of inactive and militarily 
weak members who do Hide to contribute and strengthen the alliance -  which 
runs counter to the idea that a key parameter for the choice of alliance partners is 
reliability and state reputation (Crescenzi et al. 2012, p.260). Clearly, the explana­
tion cannot lie in power or security maximization alone (cf. Gause 2017).
One way to resolve these discrepancies is by focusing on secondary functions of 
alliances and coalitions. Neither Decisive Storm nor the IM A FT are primarily 
about material military capabilities and the ability to project power. Instead, they 
can be better understood by looking at its functions as generators of symbolic 
capital and the accumulation of prestige that are meant to bolster the Saudi claim 
to regional leadership.
Why Yemen? Coalition-Building as a Means o f  Signaling Leadership
As Levy and Barnett argued, there is more to an alliance than just its provision 
of security and/or power (1991). An alliance can also serve internal aims such as 
resource-provision or regime security (David 1991). Other, secondary functions 
include reputation-building and prestige which may also drive policy. These sec­
ondary functions are usually complementary to security-seeking and power maxi­
mization, but can also stand on their own or even contradict them (Kim 2004).
Although this applies to both autocracies and democracies (see e.g. for the case of 
Canadian coalition engagement: Massie 2013), the systematic study of such fac­
tors has tended to focus on democracies. For many IR scholars, states might have 
been “like units” (Waltz 1979, p.93), but some units have been “more like” than 
others. As Reed described it: “Scholars are consistently finding that the inter­
national behavior of democracies differs from that of other regime types” (1997, 
p.1078). Democracies are said to be more durable, more prosperous (Halperin, 
Siegle 8c Weinstein 2005), less warlike (Ray 2013) and more successful in war 
(Lake 1992). During conflict, they are described as more reliable allies (Leeds 
2003), more likely to ally in the first place (Lai 8c Reiter 2000), and potentially 
more successful with their coalitions at war (Pilster 2011), especially when they 
consist of other democracies (Choi 2004).
Not all these assessments are undisputed. That democracies are really more ef­
ficient and effective at military coalitions has been controversial for some time 
(Simon 8c Gartzke 1996; Lai 8c Reiter 2000). Additionally, the focus on democ­
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racies -  while helping broaden the scope of alliance theory — diminished the role 
of non-democracies to a mere mirror-image. However, “autocratic” foreign policy 
is more than just the opposite of democratic behavior, an impression which overly 
“mystifies” autocratic behavior in two ways: first, it obscures their similarities to 
democracies and second, it ignores that the specificities of autocracies that do ex­
ist are not mere opposites of democratic behavior.
The period of heightened autocratic cooperation following the “Color Revolu­
tions” in Central Asia and Eastern Europe and the Arab Uprisings in the Middle 
East prompted relevant research on the topic (e.g. Soest 2015; Odinius &  Kuntz 
2015). Especially scholars of Comparative Politics have slowly started to put au­
thoritarian cooperation on the agenda (Erdmann et al. 2013; Mattes &  Rodríguez 
2014; Young 2014). Some of these studies show convincingly that many assump­
tions about the differences between autocracies and democracies do not hold and 
if we look closely at different kinds of autocratic regimes we find evidence that at 
least some sub-types might not be that different from democracies after all, even 
regarding key “democratic features” such as institutional constraints and account­
ability (Mattes &  Rodríguez 2014) or audience costs (Weeks 2012,2014a).
The Yemen coalition is an example of cooperation in the military realm, a new 
phenomenon for a (sub-)region where military autocratic cooperation and coor­
dination seldom encompassed more than two or three allies at a time. Research on 
military cooperation and coalition-building has nevertheless remained sparse. Es­
pecially the question of why autocrats would want to cooperate in the first place 
remains understudied (Weeks 2014Ь).ТЪе study of further functions of military 
coalitions beyond the immediate provision of security is a promising avenue of 
research and insights from autocracy research can help illuminate this field as they 
provide an especially nuanced picture of the importance of the symbolic power of 
alliances. Alliances and especially their more ephemeral manifestation, coalitions, 
can serve many of the same functions as other institutions do for authoritarian 
regimes.6
Among the most salient (secondary) functions of authoritarian institutions are 
“operating manual, billboard, blueprint, window-dressing” (Ginsburg &  Simpser 
2013, p.2). An operating manual provides a description, giving clear rules and 
guidelines toward a particular aim; a billboard is an advertisement, signaling in­
tentions or policies -  this function is especially likely to be found in democratic 
institutions as well. The last two functions point to the discrepancies between the 
actual situation and either an aspired one in the future (blueprint) or an expected 
normative ideal that is not matched by reality, as in the difference between con­
stitutional aspirations and constitutional reality (window-dressing) (Ginsburg &
á A  definition o f  institutions as “humanely devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction” (N orth 1991, p.97) is used here to include coalitions.
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Simpser 2013, pp.6—8; Ginsburg 2015).
Although these concepts have been used mainly for constitutions, they are useful 
for an analysis of alliances and especially coalitions as well. Coalitions are less 
formal, more ad-hoc and often less durable than alliances (Kober 2002, pp.1-2) 
and are more applicable to the abovementioned functions which are malleable, 
often overlapping and likely to change under different circumstances. Changes 
and adaptations to the more formal and durable alliances incur greater costs if 
“prime” functions as security and regime security are not addressed as a priority.
These secondary functions are related to the topic of symbolic politics, prestige 
and signaling of states in international politics (cf. Kim 2004). In this sphere, de­
mocracies were also regarded as superior due to their supposedly better ability to 
create audience costs to signal credible commitment (Fearon 1997). Later studies 
looking closer at the specificities of autocracies have uncovered that no absolute 
superiority exists as the ability to generate audience costs depends on specific 
institutions that vary with regime sub-types. E.g., Saudi Arabia, as a dynastic 
monarchy, is one of the autocracies that have no relative inferiority to democracies 
in signaling credible commitment (Weeks 2008). The Saudi decision to assemble 
a military coalition to fight in Yemen can be thus explained as an attempt to signal 
the ability to lead in place of the US and to attain prestige to bolster its claim to 
regional hegemony.
These symbolic functions of authoritarian institutions outlined above can all be 
traced in the anti-Houthi coalition. First, it took previous US-led “coalitions of 
the willing”, including Inherent Resolve against the IS (as well as the coalition in 
the two Gulf Wars of 1990/91 and 2003) as an operating manual providing guid­
ance how an effective or at least legitimate military intervention should look like. 
This makes the Yemen coalition a blueprint, showing the potential of the Yemen 
coalition: a stronger integration of regional security institutions. This blueprint 
is connected to other Saudi initiatives towards regional integration which have 
failed before (such as the integration of the GCC), but have in recent times re- 
emerged with the invitation of Jordan and Morocco to the GCC, financial sup­
port towards poorer GCC states (cf. Odinius &  Kuntz 2015) as well as military 
cooperation and coordination attempts and plans for a joint police force (Al Ara­
biya 2015b). By providing multilateral legitimacy and acceptance, the coalition 
also masks {window-dresses} the fact that the Yemen intervention is heavily criti­
cized, both for its claims to efficiency as well as its aims which in all likelihood 
more directly relate to regime security and hegemonic ambitions of kingdom (cf. 
Darwich 2015) and its allies than to any humanitarian or security-maximizing 
goal for Yemen itself.
A t the same time, the coalition is a billboard to showcase its leader’s -  Saudi Ara­
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bia’s — international commitment, qualification as a regional political and military 
power and its ability to replace the reclining US, to which it previously outsourced 
military leadership, by fighting its fights.7 The modeling of Decisive Storm on 
Inherent Resolve (and Desert Storm and other US-led multilateral military coali­
tions) is therefore in all likelihood not due to accident, but underlines the Saudi 
bid for succession of the US as regional hegemon and security provider in the 
Middle East. To become a regional hegemon and to attract allies to overcome 
underbalancing against Iran, Saudi Arabia needs to prove that it can take over 
the US military role. This is different from balancing as it refers to the symbolic 
aspects of signaling commitment and military prowess instead of enacting it. 
This matches the general pattern of the stronger “assertiveness” of Saudi foreign 
policy and some of its recent efforts, like the announcement of the formation of a 
large 37-member IM A FT and can be generalized towards Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy behavior in general. The Saudi-led alliance is not the first example of an 
autocracy participating in military endeavors not for security, but to signal leader­
ship. According to Al-Ahram, Egyptian troops in the coalition against Saddam 
1990/1991 were not there as “part of the U.S.-European armada, but to prove 
to Arab brothers and friends alike” that Egypt was able to take a leadership role 
(cited in: Long 2004, p.37).
The difference between material and symbolic capabilities is crucial for the dy­
namics of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Saudi Arabia has less than half the popula­
tion of Iran and although it has almost caught up with Iran in terms of active 
military personnel (it now has the third-largest armed forces after Iraq and Iran) 
(IISS 2017, p.363),8 the Saudi military is much less capable and experienced than 
the Iranian one. Iran has fought interstate wars, insurgencies and proxy conflicts 
in the last decades. This experience and manpower once led US general John Abi- 
zaid to describe its military as “the most powerful in the Middle East” among the 
Muslim-majority states (Hussain 2012).
In contrast, as described in the introductory section above, Saudi Arabia has very 
little military experience and its track record in Yemen since 2015 has demon­
strated that up-to-date equipment alone is not enough to win wars (Brimelow 
2017). In brief, Saudi Arabia, although much wealthier, is not a match for Iran 
in military terms and could not win in direct confrontation. It could, however, 
still win on symbolic grounds and by providing a rallying post against Iran. This 
explains the chosen location for the military engagement. In Syria (or Iraq or 
Lebanon for that matter), where Iranian involvement is direct and intensive, the 
effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s attempts to signal leadership ability and military 
prowess would be countered. Saudi Arabia is therefore confined to a mainly fi-
7 M edia framing shows signs that this advertising seems to work (see e.g. Trofimov 2015; O baid 2015).
8 W hile Saudi Arabia now boasts 227,000 active personnel, Iran still has 523,000, although the 2016 
Saudi Arabian defense budget was more than three times that o f its neighbor (IISS 2017, pp .376 ,401).
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nancial and diplomatic role there (Hokayem 2014). In Yemen, where no Iranian 
troops are present and only weak ties between Iran and the Houthis and their 
allies exist, such signaling is stronger.
Nevertheless, signaling is not completely divorced from material capabilities. To 
bolster legitimacy and provide credibility, it must be costly (Fearon 1997).This ex­
plains the immense financial commitment in Yemen as well as the willingness to 
sustain heavy unprecedented casualties. I t is mirrored in the intense domestic and 
regional propaganda campaign surrounding the coalition and the fight against 
Iran in general (see Matthiesen &  Sons 2016; Hashemi &Postel 2017).
This does not mean that this policy has been successful. To the contrary, most 
evidence implies that it failed. Iran was dragged into the conflict in Yemen and 
began supporting the Houthis, of which there was no prior evidence before the 
operation, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Saudi and Emirati efforts to side­
line Qatar and strengthen their position against Iran backfired as no unified block 
emerged. To the contrary, Iran and Turkey strengthened their relationships with 
Qatar and underbalancing is even more pronounced than previously. The Yemen 
war drags on for more than two years with little visible success (cf. Nasser 2016; 
El Yaakoubi 2017). Given the amount of investment in the effort by S audi Arabia, 
ending the war without tangible results would be problematic for the ruling elite.
Conclusion
As many scholars have so far pointed out, Saudi Arabia’s drive to an “assertive”for­
eign policy is induced by national and regional power and security concerns, given 
the perception of Iran as the main threat and the US withdrawal from the region. 
However, systemic balance-of-fhreat-theory, even if  enhanced by ideational ele­
ments, struggles to explain the emergence of the multilateral coalition in the first 
place and the Saudi preference for engagement in Yemen instead of Syria, where 
Iranian influence is more entrenched and balancing attempts would therefore be 
more effective. Supplementing this well-established systemic element of regional 
power shifts with a domestic, regime-type centered element -  symbolic functions 
of authoritarian institutions -  helps explain these choices as a means to overcome 
underbalancing and establish itself as a candidate for regional leadership.
Autocracy research helps demystifying autocratic cooperation, with the emergent 
literature showing that autocracies are not necessarily that different from democ­
racies when it comes to foreign policy behavior. Literature on the functions of 
authoritarian institutions illuminates the incentives for autocracies to instigate 
cooperation and bridges the gap between IR  and Comparative Politics. Besides 
external and regime security, military coalitions have additional symbolic and sig­
naling functions for some authoritarian states. The multilateral cooperation and
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coalition-building by Saudi Arabia helps to illuminate the features and drivers of 
authoritarian cooperation.
A t the same time, we need to embed these institutional functions into a regional 
and global scenario where a superpower is withdrawing from the region, creating 
a power vacuum which creates balancing behavior by aspiring regional hegemons. 
This is possibly the first time since the formation of the modern Middle East 
regional system that an external hegemon hands over the reins completely to re­
gional actors, thereby enabling them but also forcing them to fend for themselves. 
This marks a watershed for regional actors’ security cooperation and a constitutive 
phenomenon that might cement Saudi assertiveness as a more durable mark of 
Middle Eastern politics. I t appears that the kingdom can no longer rely on “riyal- 
politik” alone, marking a return to the old-new politics of the “ghazwa”.
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